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Abstract
This paper deals with the impact of fault prediction techniques on checkpointing strategies.
We extend the classical first-order analysis of Young and Daly in the presence of a fault
prediction system, characterized by its recall and its precision. In this framework, we provide
optimal algorithms to decide whether and when to take predictions into account, and we
derive the optimal value of the checkpointing period. These results allow to analytically
assess the key parameters that impact the performance of fault predictors at very large
scale.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays, the most powerful High Performance Computing systems experience about
one fault per day [1, 2]. Consider the relative slopes describing the evolution of the reliability
of individual components on one side, and the evolution of the number of components on the
other side: the reliability of an entire platform is expected to decrease, due to probabilistic
amplification, as its number of components increases. Therefore, applications running on
large computing systems have to cope with platform faults. There are two main approaches.
On the one hand, applications can use fault-tolerance mechanisms such as checkpoint and
rollback in order to become resilient. On the other hand, system administrators can try to
predict where and when faults will strike. Although considerable research has been devoted to
fault predictors [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], no predictor will ever be able to predict every fault. Therefore,
fault predictors will have to be used in conjunction with fault-tolerance mechanisms.
In this paper, we assess the impact of fault prediction techniques on checkpointing strate-
gies. We assume to have jobs executing on a platform subject to faults, and we let µ be the
Mean Time Between Faults (MTBF) of the platform. In the absence of fault prediction, the
standard approach is to take periodic checkpoints, each of length C, every period of dura-
tion T . In steady-state utilization of the platform, the value Topt of T that minimizes the
expected waste of resource usage due to checkpointing is approximated as Topt =
√
2µC+C,
or Topt =
√
2(µ+R)C+C (where R is the duration of the recovery). The former expression
is the well-known Young’s formula [9], while the latter is due to Daly [10].
Now, when some fault prediction mechanism is available, can we compute a better check-
pointing period to decrease the expected waste? and to what extent? Critical parameters
that characterize a fault prediction system are its recall r, which is the fraction of faults
that are indeed predicted, and its precision p, which is the fraction of predictions that are
correct (i.e., correspond to actual faults). The major objective of this paper is to refine
the expression of the expected waste as a function of these new parameters, and to design
efficient checkpointing policies that take predictions into account. The key contributions of
this paper are:
• A refined first-order analysis in the absence of fault prediction. It leads to similar
performance to Young [9] and Daly [10] when faults follow an Exponential distribution,
and to better performance when faults follow a Weibull distribution.
• The extension of this analysis to fault predictions, and the design of new checkpointing
policies that takes optimal decisions on whether and when to take these predictions
into account (or to ignore them).
• For policies where the decision to trust the predictor is taken with the same proba-
bility throughout the checkpointing period, we show that we should always trust the
predictor, or never, depending upon platform and predictor parameters.
• For policies where the decision to trust the predictor is taken with variable probability
during the checkpointing period, we show that we should change strategy only once
in the period, moving from never trusting the predictor when the prediction arrives
in the beginning of the period, to always trusting the predictor when the prediction
arrives later on in the period, and we determine the optimal break-even point.
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• For all policies, we compute the optimal value of the checkpointing period thereby
designing optimal algorithms to minimize the waste when coupling checkpointing with
predictions.
• An extensive set of simulations that corroborates all mathematical derivations. These
simulations are based on synthetic fault traces (for Exponential fault distributions,
and for more realistic Weibull fault distributions) and on log-based fault traces. In
addition, they include exact prediction dates and uncertainty intervals for these dates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first detail the framework in Section 2.
We revisit Young and Daly’s approach in Section 3. We provide optimal algorithms to
account for predictions in Section 4: we start with simpler policies where the decision to
trust the predictor is taken with the same probability throughout the checkpointing period
(Section 4.1) before dealing with the most general approach where the decision to trust the
predictor is taken with variable probability during the checkpointing period (Section 4.2).
Section 5 is devoted to simulations: we first describe the framework (Section 5.1) and then
discuss synthetic and log-based failure traces in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. We discuss
related work in Section 6. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in Section 7.
p Predictor precision: proportion of true positives among the number of predicted
faults
r Predictor recall: proportion of predicted faults among total number of faults
q Probability to trust the predictor
MTBF Mean Time Between Faults
N Number of processors in the platform
µ Platform MTBF
µind Individual MTBF
µP Rate of predicted faults
µNP Rate of unpredicted faults
µe Rate of events (predictions or unpredicted faults)
D Downtime
R Recovery time
C Duration of a regular checkpoint
Cp Duration of a proactive checkpoint
T Duration of a period
Table 1: Table of main notations.
2. Framework
2.1. Checkpointing strategy
We consider a platform subject to faults. Our work is agnostic of the granularity of the
platform, which may consist either of a single processor, or of several processors that work
concurrently and use coordinated checkpointing. Checkpoints are taken at regular intervals,
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or periods, of length T . We denote by C the duration of a checkpoint (all checkpoints have
same duration). By construction, we must enforce that C ≤ T . When a fault strikes the
platform, the application is lacking some resource for a certain period of time of length D,
the downtime. The downtime accounts for software rejuvenation (i.e., rebooting [11, 12]) or
for the replacement of the failed hardware component by a spare one. Then, the application
recovers from the last checkpoint. R denotes the duration of this recovery time.
2.2. Fault predictor
A fault predictor is a mechanism that is able to predict that some faults will take place,
either at a certain point in time, or within some time-interval window. In this paper, we
assume that the predictor is able to provide exact prediction dates, and to generate such
predictions early enough so that a proactive checkpoint can indeed be taken before the event.
The accuracy of the fault predictor is characterized by two quantities, the recall and the
precision. The recall r is the fraction of faults that are predicted while the precision p is the
fraction of fault predictions that are correct. Traditionally, one defines three types of events :
(i) True positive events are faults that the predictor has been able to predict (let TrueP
be their number); (ii) False positive events are fault predictions that did not materialize as
actual faults (let FalseP be their number); and (iii) False negative events are faults that were
not predicted (let FalseN be their number). With these definitions, we have r =
TrueP
TrueP+FalseN
and p = TrueP
TrueP+FalseP
.
Proactive checkpoints may have a different length Cp than regular checkpoints of length
C. In fact there are many scenarios. On the one hand, we may well have Cp > C in scenarios
where regular checkpoints are taken at time-steps where the application memory footprint
is minimal [13]; on the contrary, proactive checkpoints are taken according to predictions
that can take place at arbitrary instants. On the other hand, we may have Cp < C in other
scenarios [8], e.g., when the prediction is localized to a particular resource subset, hence
allowing for a smaller volume of checkpointed data.
To keep full generality, we deal with two checkpoint sizes in this paper: C for periodic
checkpoints, and Cp for proactive checkpoints (those taken upon predictions).
In the literature, the lead time is the interval between the date at which the prediction
is made available, and the actual prediction date. While the lead time is an important
parameter, the shape of its distribution law is irrelevant to the problem: either a fault is
predicted at least Cp seconds in advance, and then one can checkpoint just in time before
the fault, or the prediction is useless! In other words, predictions that come too late should
be classified as unpredicted faults whenever they materialize as actual faults, leading to a
smaller value of the predictor recall.
2.3. Fault rates
The key parameter is µ, the MTBF of the platform. If the platform is made of N
components whose individual MTBF is µind, then µ =
µind
N
. This result is true regardless of
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the fault distribution law2.
In addition to µ, the platform MTBF, let µP be the mean time between predicted events
(both true positive and false positive), and let µNP be the mean time between unpredicted
faults (false negative). Finally, we define the mean time between events as µe (including all
three event types). The relationships between µ, µP, µNP, and µe are the following:
• Rate of unpredicted faults: 1
µNP
= 1−r
µ
, since 1 − r is the fraction of faults that are
unpredicted;
• Rate of predicted faults: r
µ
= p
µP
, since r is the fraction of faults that are predicted,
and p is the fraction of fault predictions that are correct;
• Rate of events: 1
µe
= 1
µP
+ 1
µNP
, since events are either predictions (true or false), or
unpredicted faults.
2.4. Objective: waste minimization
The natural objective is to minimize the expectation of the total execution time, makespan,
of the application. Instead, in order to ease mathematical derivations, we aim at minimiz-
ing the waste. The waste is the expected percentage of time lost, or “wasted”, during the
execution. In other words, the waste is the fraction of time during which the platform is not
doing useful work. This definition was introduced by Wingstrom [14]. Obviously, the lower
the waste, the lower the expected makespan, and reciprocally. Hence the two objectives are
strongly related and minimizing one of them also minimizes the other.
3. Revisiting Daly’s first-order approximation
Young proposed in [9] a “first order approximation to the optimum checkpoint interval”.
Young’s formula was later refined by Daly [10] to take into account the recovery time. We
revisit their analysis using the notion of waste.
Let Timebase be the base time of the application without any overhead (neither check-
points nor faults). First, assume a fault-free execution of the application with periodic
checkpointing. In such an environment, during each period of length T we take a check-
point, which lasts for a time C, and only T −C units of work are executed. Let TimeFF be
the execution time of the application in this setting. Following most works in the literature,
we also take a checkpoint at the end of the execution. The fault-free execution time TimeFF
is equal to the time needed to execute the whole application, Timebase, plus the time taken
by the checkpoints:
TimeFF = Timebase +NckptC (1)
where Nckpt is the number of checkpoints taken. We have
Nckpt =
⌈
Timebase
T − C
⌉
≈ Timebase
T − C
2For the sake of completeness, we provide a proof of this widely-used result in AppendixA. To the best
of our knowledge, no proof has been published in the literature yet.
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When discarding the ceiling function, we assume that the execution time is very large with
respect to the period or, symmetrically, that there are many periods during the execution.
Plugging back the (approximated) value Nckpt =
Timebase
T−C
, we derive that
TimeFF =
Timebase
T − C T (2)
The waste due to checkpointing in a fault-free execution, WasteFF, is defined as the
fraction of the execution time that does not contribute to the progress of the application:
WasteFF =
TimeFF −Timebase
TimeFF
⇔ (1−WasteFF)TimeFF = Timebase (3)
Combining Equations (2) and (3), we get:
WasteFF =
C
T
(4)
Now, let Timefinal denote the expected execution time of the application in the presence
of faults. This execution time can be divided into two parts: (i) the execution of “chunks”
of work of size T − C followed by their checkpoint; and (ii) the time lost due to the faults.
This decomposition is illustrated by Figure 1. The first part of the execution time is equal
to TimeFF. Let Nfaults be the number of faults occurring during the execution, and let Tlost
be the average time lost per fault. Then,
Timefinal = TimeFF +Nfaults × Tlost (5)
On average, during a time Timefinal, Nfaults =
Timefinal
µ
faults happen. We need to esti-
mate Tlost. The instants at which periods begin and at which faults strike are independent.
Therefore, the expected time elapsed between the completion of the last checkpoint and a
fault is T
2
for all distribution laws, regardless of their particular shape. We conclude that
Tlost =
T
2
+D + R, because after each fault there is a downtime and a recovery. This leads
to:
Timefinal = TimeFF +
Timefinal
µ
×
(
D +R +
T
2
)
Let Wastefault be the fraction of the total execution time that is lost because of faults:
Wastefault =
Timefinal −TimeFF
Timefinal
⇔ (1−Wastefault)Timefinal = TimeFF (6)
We derive:
Wastefault =
1
µ
(
D +R +
T
2
)
. (7)
In [10], Daly uses the expression
Timefinal =
(
1 +Wastefault
)
TimeFF (8)
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TimeFF =TimeFinal (1-WasteFail) TimeFinal ×WasteFail
TimeFinal
T -C C T -C C T -C C T -C C T -C C
T -C C T -C C T -C C T -C C T -C C
Figure 1: An execution (top), and its re-ordering (bottom), to illustrate both sources of waste. Blackened
intervals correspond to work destroyed by faults, downtimes, and recoveries.
instead of Equation (6), which leads him to his well-known first-order formula
T =
√
2(µ+ (D +R))C + C (9)
Figure 1 explains why Equation (8) is not correct and should be replaced by Equation (6).
Indeed, the expected number of faults depends on the final time, not on the time for a
fault-free execution. We point out that Young [9] also used Equation (8), but with D =
R = 0. Equation (6) can be rewritten Timefinal = TimeFF/ (1−Wastefault). Therefore,
using Equation (8) instead of Equation (6), in fact, is equivalent to write 1
1−Wastefault
≈
1 +Wastefault which is indeed a first-order approximation if Wastefault ≪ 1.
Now, let Waste denote the total waste:
Waste =
Timefinal −Timebase
Timefinal
(10)
Therefore
Waste = 1− Timebase
Timefinal
= 1− Timebase
TimeFF
TimeFF
Timefinal
= 1− (1−WasteFF)(1−Wastefault).
Altogether, we derive the final result:
Waste = WasteFF +Wastefault −WasteFFWastefault (11)
=
C
T
+
(
1− C
T
)
1
µ
(
D +R +
T
2
)
(12)
We obtain Waste = u
T
+ v + wT where u = C
(
1 − D+R
µ
)
, v = D+R−C/2
µ
, and w = 1
2µ
.
Thus Waste is minimized for T =
√
u
w
. The Refined First-Order (RFO) formula for the
optimal period is thus:
TRFO =
√
2(µ− (D +R))C (13)
It is interesting to point out why Equation (13) is a first-order approximation, even for
large jobs. Indeed, there are several restrictions to enforce for the approach to be valid:
• We have stated that the expected number of faults during execution is Nfaults =
Timefinal
µ
,
and that the expected time lost due to a fault is Tlost =
T
2
. Both statements are true
individually, but the expectation of a product is the product of the expectations only
if the random variables are independent, which is not the case here because Timefinal
depends upon the failure inter-arrival times.
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• In Equation (4), we have to enforce C ≤ T to have WasteFF ≤ 1
• In Equation (7), we have to enforce D + R ≤ µ and to bound T in order to have
Wastefault ≤ 1. Intuitively, we need µ to be large enough for Equation (7) to make
sense. However, regardless of the value of the individual MTBF µind, there is always a
threshold in the number of components N above which the platform MTBF µ = µind
N
becomes too small for Equation (7) to be valid.
• Equation (7) is accurate only when two or more faults do not take place within the
same period. Although unlikely when µ is large in front of T , the possible occurrence
of many faults during the same period cannot be eliminated.
To ensure that the latter condition (at most a single fault per period) is met with a high
probability, we cap the length of the period: we enforce the condition T ≤ αµ, where α is
some tuning parameter chosen as follows. The number of faults during a period of length T
can be modeled as a Poisson process of parameter β = T
µ
. The probability of having k ≥ 0
faults is P (X = k) = β
k
k!
e−β, where X is the number of faults. Hence the probability of
having two or more faults is pi = P (X ≥ 2) = 1− (P (X = 0)+P (X = 1)) = 1− (1+β)e−β.
If we assume α = 0.27 then pi ≤ 0.03, hence a valid approximation when bounding the period
range accordingly. Indeed, with such a conservative value for α, we have overlapping faults
for only 3% of the checkpointing segments in average, so that the model is quite reliable.
For consistency, we also enforce the same type of bound on the checkpoint time, and on the
downtime and recovery: C ≤ αµ and D + R ≤ αµ. However, enforcing these constraints
may lead to use a sub-optimal period: it may well be the case that the optimal period√
2(µ− (D +R))C of Equation (13) does not belong to the admissible interval [C, αµ]. In
that case, the waste is minimized for one of the bounds of the admissible interval: this is
because, as seen from Equation (12), the waste is a convex function of the period.
We conclude this discussion on a positive note. While capping the period, and enforcing a
lower bound on the MTBF, is mandatory for mathematical rigor, simulations (see Section 5
for both Exponential and Weibull distributions) show that actual job executions can always
use the value from Equation (13), accounting for multiple faults whenever they occur by re-
executing the work until success. The first-order model turns out to be surprisingly robust!
To the best of our knowledge, despite all the limitations above, there is no better approach
to estimate the waste due to checkpointing when dealing with arbitrary fault distributions.
However, assuming that faults obey an Exponential distribution, it is possible to use the
memory-less property of this distribution to provide more accurate results. A second-order
approximation when faults obey an Exponential distribution is given in Daly [10, Equa-
tion (20)] as Timefinal = µe
R/µ(e
T
µ − 1)Timebase
T−C
. In fact, in that case, the exact value of
Timefinal is provided in [15, 16] as Timefinal = (µ+D)e
R/µ(e
T
µ − 1)Timebase
T−C
, and the optimal
period is then 1+L(−e
−
C
µ −1)
µ
where L, the Lambert function, is defined as L(z)eL(z) = z.
To assess the accuracy of the different first order approximations, we compare the periods
defined by Young’s formula [9], Daly’s formula [10], and Equation (13), to the optimal period,
in the case of an Exponential distribution. Results are reported in Table 2. To establish
these results, we use the same parameters as in Section 5: C = R = 600 s, D = 60 s, and
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µind = 125 years. Furthermore, to compute the optimal period, for each platform size we
choose the application size so that Timebase = 2 hours. One can observe in Table 2 that
the relative error for Daly’s period is slightly larger than the one for Young’s period. In
turn, the absolute value of the relative error for Young’s period is slightly larger than the
one for RFO. More importantly, when Young’s and Daly’s formulas overestimate the period,
RFO underestimates it. Table 2 does not allow us to assess whether these differences are
actually significant. However we also report in Section 5.2 some simulations that show that
Equation (13) leads to smaller execution times for Weibull distributions than both classical
formulas (Tables 4 and 5).
N µ Young Daly RFO Optimal
210 3849609 68567 (0.5 %) 68573 (0.5 %) 67961 (-0.4 %) 68240
211 1924805 48660 (0.7 %) 48668 (0.7 %) 48052 (-0.6 %) 48320
212 962402 34584 (1.2 %) 34595 (1.2 %) 33972 (-0.6 %) 34189
213 481201 24630 (1.6 %) 24646 (1.7 %) 24014 (-0.9 %) 24231
214 240601 17592 (2.3 %) 17615 (2.5 %) 16968 (-1.3 %) 17194
215 120300 12615 (3.2 %) 12648 (3.5 %) 11982 (-1.9 %) 12218
216 60150 9096 (4.5 %) 9142 (5.1 %) 8449 (-2.9 %) 8701
217 30075 6608 (6.3 %) 6673 (7.4 %) 5941 (-4.4 %) 6214
218 15038 4848 (8.8 %) 4940 (10.8 %) 4154 (-6.8 %) 4458
219 7519 3604 (12.0 %) 3733 (16.0 %) 2869 (-10.8 %) 3218
Table 2: Comparing periods produced by the different approximations with optimal value. Beside each
period, we report its relative deviation to the optimal. Each value is expressed in seconds.
4. Taking predictions into accounts
In this section, we present an analytical model to assess the impact of predictions on
periodic checkpointing strategies. As already mentioned, we consider the case where the
predictor is able to provide exact prediction dates, and to generate such predictions at least
Cp seconds in advance, so that a proactive checkpoint of length Cp can indeed be taken
before the event.
For the sake of clarity, we start with a simple algorithm (Section 4.1) which we refine in
Section 4.2. We then compute the value of the period that minimizes the waste in Section 4.3.
4.1. Simple policy
In this section, we consider the following algorithm:
• While no fault prediction is available, checkpoints are taken periodically with period
T ;
• When a fault is predicted, there are two cases: either there is the possibility to take
a proactive checkpoint, or there is not enough time to do so, because we are already
9
checkpointing (see Figures 2(b) and 2(c)). In the latter case, there is no other choice
than ignoring the prediction. In the former case, we still have the possibility to ignore
the prediction, but we may also decide to trust it: in fact the decision is randomly
taken. With probability q, we trust the predictor and take the prediction into account
(see Figures 2(f) and 2(g)), and with probability 1 − q, we ignore the prediction (see
Figures 2(d) and 2(e));
• If we take the prediction into account, we take a proactive checkpoint (of length Cp) as
late as possible, i.e., so that it completes right at the time when the fault is predicted to
happen. After this checkpoint, we complete the execution of the period (see Figures 2(f)
and 2(g));
• If we ignore the prediction, either by necessity (not enough time to take an extra check-
point, see Figures 2(b) and 2(c)), or or by choice (with probability 1− q, Figures 2(d)
and 2(e)), we finish the current period and start a new one.
The rationale for not always trusting the predictor is to avoid taking useless checkpoints
too frequently. Intuitively, the precision p of the predictor must be above a given threshold
for its usage to be worthwhile. In other words, if we decide to checkpoint just before a
predicted event, either we will save time by avoiding a costly re-execution if the event does
correspond to an actual fault, or we will lose time by unduly performing an extra checkpoint.
We need a larger proportion of the former cases, i.e., a good precision, for the predictor to
be really useful. The following analysis will determine the optimal value of q as a function
of the parameters C, Cp, µ, r, and p.
We could refine the approach by taking into account the amount of work already done
in the current period when deciding whether to trust the predictor or not. Intuitively, the
more work already done, the more important to save it, hence the more worthwhile to trust
the predictor. We design such a refined strategy in Section 4.2. Right now, we analyze a
simpler algorithm where we decide to trust or not to trust the predictor, independently of
the amount of work done so far within the period.
We analyze the algorithm in order to compute a formula for the expected waste, just as
in Equation (12). While the value of WasteFF is unchanged (WasteFF =
C
T
), the value of
Wastefault is modified because of predictions. As illustrated in Figure 2, there are many
different scenarios that contribute to Wastefault that can be sorted into three categories:
(1) Unpredicted faults: This overhead occurs each time an unpredicted fault strikes, that
is, on average, once every µNP seconds. Just as in Equation (7), the corresponding waste is
1
µNP
[
T
2
+D +R
]
.
(2) Predictions not taken into account: The second source of waste is for predictions
that are ignored. This overhead occurs in two different scenarios. First, if we do not have
time to take a proactive checkpoint, we have an overhead if and only the prediction is an
actual fault. This case happens with probability p. We then lose a time t + D + R if the
predicted fault happens a time t after the completion of the last periodic checkpoint. The
10
TimeT -C T -C Tlost T -C
fault
C C C D R C
(a) Unpredicted fault
TimeT -C T -C
Predicted fault
T -C T -C
C C C C C
(b) Prediction cannot be taken into account - no actual fault
TimeT -C Tlost
fault Predicted fault
T -C T -C T -C
C C D R C C C
(c) Prediction cannot be taken into account - with actual fault
TimeT -C T -C
Predicted fault
T -C T -C
C C C C C
(d) Prediction not taken into account by choice - no actual fault
TimeT -C Tlost
fault Predicted fault
T -C T -C
C C D R C C
(e) Prediction not taken into account by choice - with actual fault
TimeT -C Wreg
Predicted fault
T -Wreg -C T -C T -C
C C Cp C C C
(f) Prediction taken into account - no actual fault
TimeT -C Wreg
fault Predicted fault
T -Wreg -C T -C
C C Cp D R C C
(g) Prediction taken into account - with actual fault
Figure 2: Actions taken for the different event types.
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expected time lost is thus
T 1lost =
1
T
∫ Cp
0
(p(t+D +R) + (1− p)0) dt
Then, if we do have time to take a proactive checkpoint but still decide to ignore the predic-
tion, we also have an overhead if and only the prediction is an actual fault, but the expected
time lost is now weighted by the probability (1− q):
T 2lost = (1− q)
1
T
∫ T
Cp
(p(t+D +R) + (1− p)0) dt
(3) Predictions taken into account: We now compute the overhead due to a prediction
which we trust (hence we checkpoint just before its date). If the prediction is an actual fault,
we lose Cp +D + R seconds, but if it is not, we lose the unnecessary extra checkpoint time
Cp. The expected time lost is now weighted by the probability q and becomes
T 3lost = q
1
T
∫ T
Cp
(p(Cp +D +R) + (1− p)Cp) dt
We derive the final value of Wastefault:
Wastefault =
1
µNP
[
T
2
+D +R
]
+
1
µP
[
T 1lost + T
2
lost + T
3
lost
]
This final expression comes from the disjunction of all possibles cases, using the Law of Total
Probability [17, p.23]: the waste comes either from non-predicted faults or from predictions;
in the latter case, we have analyzed the three possible sub-cases and weighted them with
their respective probabilities. After simplifications, we obtain
Wastefault =
1
µ
(
(1− rq)T
2
+D +R +
qr
p
Cp −
qrC2p
pT
(1− p/2)
)
(14)
We could now plug this expression back into Equation (11) to compute the value of T that
minimizes the total waste. Instead, we move on to describing the refined algorithm, and we
minimize the waste for the refined strategy, since it always induces a smaller waste.
4.2. Refined policy
In this section, we refine the approach and consider different trust strategies, depending
upon the time in the period where the prediction takes place. Intuitively, the later in the
period, the more likely we are inclined to trust the predictor, because the amount of work
that we could lose gets larger and larger. As before, we cannot take into account a fault
predicted to happen less than Cp units of time after the beginning of the period. Therefore,
we focus on what happens in the period after time Cp. Formally, we now divide the interval
[Cp, T ] into n intervals [βi; βi+1] for i ∈ {0, · · · , n − 1}, where β0 = Cp and βn = T . For
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each interval [βi; βi+1], we trust the predictor with probability qi. We aim at determining the
values of n, βi, and qi that minimize the waste. As mentioned before, intuition tells us that
the qi values should be non-decreasing. We prove below a somewhat unexpected theorem:
in the optimal strategy, there is either one or two different qi values, and these values are 0
or 1. This means that we should never trust the predictor in the beginning of a period, and
always trust it in the end of the period, without any intermediate behavior in between.
We formally express this striking result below. Let βlim =
Cp
p
. The optimal strategy is
provided by Theorem 1 below. We first prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The values of βi and qi that minimize the waste satisfy the following con-
ditions:
(i) For all i such that βi+1 ≤ βlim, qi = 0.
(ii) For all i such that βi ≥ βlim, qi = 1.
Proof. First we compute the waste with the refined algorithm, using Equation (11). The
formula for Wastefault is similar to Equation (14) on each interval:
Waste =
C
T
+
(
1− C
T
)[
1
µNP
(
T
2
+D +R
)
+
1
µP
n−1∑
i=0
(
qi
∫ βi+1
βi
(p(Cp +D +R) + (1− p)Cp)
T
dt
+ (1− qi)
∫ βi+1
βi
p(t+D +R)
T
dt
)]
Now, consider a fixed value of i and express the value of Waste as a function of qi:
Waste = K +
(
1− C
T
)
qi
µP
∫ βi+1
βi
(
Cp
T
− pt
T
)
dt
where K does not depend on qi. From the sign of the function to be integrated, one sees
that Waste is minimized when qi = 0 if βi+1 ≤ βlim = Cpp , and when qi = 1 if βi ≥ βlim.
Theorem 1. The optimal algorithm takes proactive actions if and only if the prediction falls
in the interval [βlim, T ].
Proof. From Proposition 1, the values for qi are optimally defined for every i but one: we do
not know the optimal value if there exists i0 such that βi0 < βlim < βi0+1. Then let us consider
the waste where qi0 is replaced by q
(1)
i0
on [βi0 , βlim] and by q
(2)
i0
on [βlim, βi0+1]. The new waste
is necessarily smaller than the one with only qi0 , since we relaxed the constraint. We know
from Proposition 1 that the optimal solution is then to have q
(1)
i0
= 0 and q
(2)
i0
= 1.
Let us now compute the value of the waste with the optimal algorithm. There are two
cases, depending upon whether T ≤ βlim or not. For values of T smaller than βlim, Theorem 1
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shows that the optimal algorithm never takes any proactive action; in that case the waste is
given by Equation (12) in Section 3. For values of T larger than βlim =
Cp
p
, we compute the
waste due to predictions as
1
µP
1
T
(∫ Cp/p
0
p(t+D +R)dt+
∫ T
Cp/p
(p(Cp +D +R) + (1− p)Cp)dt
)
=
r
pµ
(
p(D +R) + Cp −
C2p
2pT
)
Indeed, in accordance with Theorem 1, no prediction is taken into account in the interval
[0, Cp
p
], while all predictions are taken into account in the interval [Cp
p
, T ]. Adding the waste
due to unpredicted faults, namely 1
µNP
[
T
2
+D +R
]
, we derive
Wastefault =
1
µ
(
(1− r)T
2
+
r
p
Cp
(
1− 1
2p
Cp
T
)
+D +R
)
.
Plugging this value into Equation (11), we obtain the total waste when Cp
p
≤ T :
Waste =
C
T
+
1
µ
(
(1− r)T
2
+
r
p
Cp
(
1− 1
2p
Cp
T
)
+D +R
)(
1− C
T
)
=
rCC2p
2p2
1
µT 2
+
(
µC − rC
2
p
2p2
− C
(
rCp
p
+D +R
))
1
µT
+
1− r
2µ
T
+
−(1− r)C
2
+ rCp
p
+D +R
µ
Altogether, the expression for the total waste becomes:

Waste1(T ) =
C(1−D+Rµ )
T
+ D+R−C/2
µ
+ 1
2µ
T if Cp
p
≥ T
Waste2(T ) =
rCC2p
2µp2
1
T 2
+
(
C
(
1−
rCp
p +D+R
µ
)
−
rC2p
2µp2
)
T
+
−(1−r)C
2
+
rCp
p
+D+R
µ
+ 1−r
2µ
T if Cp
p
≤ T
(15)
One can check that when r = 0 (no error predicted, hence no proactive action in the algo-
rithm), then Waste1 and Waste2 coincide. We also check that both values coincide for
T = Cp
p
. We show how to minimize the waste in Equation (15) in Section 4.3.
4.3. Waste minimization
In this section we focus on minimizing the waste in Equation (15). Recall that, by
construction, we always have to enforce the constraint T ≥ C. First consider the case where
C ≤ Cp
p
. On the interval T ∈ [C, Cp
p
], we retrieve the optimal value found in Section 3, and
derive that Waste1, the waste when predictions are not taken into account, is minimized
for
TNoPred = max
(
C,min
(
TRFO,
Cp
p
))
(16)
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Indeed, the optimal value should belong to the interval [C, Cp
p
], and the function Waste1 is
convex: if the extremal solution
√
2(µ− (D +R))C does not belong to this interval, then
the optimal value is one of the bounds of the interval.
On the interval T ∈
[
Cp
p
,+∞
)
, we find the optimal solution by differentiating twice
Waste2 with respect to T . Writing Waste2(T ) =
u
T 2
+ v
T
+w+xT for simplicity, we obtain
Waste
′′
2(T ) =
2
T 3
(
3u
T
+ v
)
. Here, a key parameter is the sign of :
v =
(
C
(
1−
rCp
p
+D +R
µ
)
− rC
2
p
2µp2
)
We detail the case v ≥ 0 in the following, because it is the most frequent with realistic
parameter sets; we do have v ≥ 0 for all the whole range of simulations in Section 5. For the
sake of completeness, we will briefly discuss the case v < 0 in the comments below.
When v ≥ 0, we have Waste′′2(T ) ≥ 0, so that Waste2 is convex on the interval[
Cp
p
,+∞
)
and admits a unique minimum Textr. Note that Textr can be computed either
numerically or using Cardano’s method, since it is the unique real root of a polynomial of
degree 3. The optimal solution on
[
Cp
p
,+∞
)
is then: TPred = max
(
Textr,
Cp
p
)
.
It remains to consider the case where Cp
p
< C. In fact, it suffices to add the constraint
that the value of TPred should be greater than C, that is:
TPred = max
(
C,max
(
Textr,
Cp
p
))
(17)
Finally, the optimal solution for the waste is given by the minimum of the following two
values: 

C(1−D+Rµ )
TNoPred
+ D+R−C/2
µ
+ 1
2µ
TNoPred
rCC2p
2µp2
1
T 2
Pred
+
(
C
(
1−
rCp
p +D+R
µ
)
−
rC2p
2µp2
)
TPred
+
−(1−r)C
2
+
rCp
p
+D+R
µ
+ 1−r
2µ
TPred
We make a few observations:
• Just as for Equation (13) in Section 3, mathematical rigor calls for capping the values of
D, R, C, Cp and T in front of the MTBF. The only difference is that we should replace
µ by µe: this is to account for the occurrence rate of all events, be they unpredicted
faults or predictions.
• While the expression of the waste looks complicated, the numerical value of the optimal
period can easily be computed in all cases. We have dealt with the case v ≥ 0, where
v is the coefficient of 1/T in Waste2(T ) =
u
T 2
+ v
T
+ w + xT . When v < 0 we only
needs to compute all the nonnegative real roots of a polynomial of degree 3, and check
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which one leads to the best value. More precisely, these root(s) partition the admissible
interval
[
Cp
p
,+∞
)
into several sub-intervals, and the optimal value is either a root or
a sub-interval bound.
• In many practical situations, when µ is large enough, we can dramatically simplify the
expression ofWaste2(T ): we have T = O(
√
µ), the term u
T 2
becomes negligible, check-
point parameters become negligible in front of µ, and we derive the approximated value√
2µC
1−r
. This value can be seen as an extension of Equation (13) giving TRFO, where µ
is replaced by µ
1−r
: faults are replaced by non-predicted faults, and the overhead due
to false predictions is negligible. As a word of caution, recall that this conclusion is
valid only when µ is very large in front of all other parameters.
5. Simulation results
We start by presenting the simulation framework (Section 5.1). Then we report results
using synthetic traces (Section 5.2) and log-based traces (Section 5.3). Finally, we assess the
respective impact of the two key parameters of a predictor, its recall and its precision, on
checkpointing strategies (Section 5.4).
5.1. Simulation framework
Scenario generation – In order to check the accuracy of our model and of our analysis, and
to assess the potential benefits of predictors, we study the performance of our new solutions
and of pre-existing ones using a discrete-event simulator. The simulation engine generates
a random trace of faults. Given a set of p processors, a failure trace is a set of failure dates
for each processor over a fixed time horizon h (set to 2 years). Given the distribution of
inter-arrival times at a processor, for each processor we generate a trace via independent
sampling until the target time horizon is reached. The job start time is assumed to be one-
year to avoid side-effects related to the synchronous initialization of all nodes/processors.
We consider two types of failure traces, namely synthetic and log-based.
Synthetic failure traces – The simulation engine generates a random trace of faults
parameterized either by an Exponential fault distribution or by Weibull distribution laws
with shape parameter either 0.5 or 0.7. Note that Exponential faults are widely used for
theoretical studies, while Weibull faults are representative of the behavior of real-world
platforms [18, 19, 20, 21]. For example, Heien et al. [21] have studied the failure distribution
for 6 sources of failures (storage devices, NFS, batch system, memory and processor cache
errors, etc.), and the aggregate failure distribution. They have shown that the aggregate
failure distribution is best modeled by a Weibull distribution with a shape parameter that
is between 0.5841 and 0.7097.
The Jaguar platform, which comprised N = 45, 208 processors, is reported to have expe-
rienced about one fault per day [1], which leads to an individual (processor) MTBF µind equal
to 45,208
365
≈ 125 years. Therefore, we set the individual (processor) MTBF to µind = 125 years.
We let the total number of processors N vary from N = 16, 384 to N = 524, 288, so that the
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platform MTBF µ varies from µ = 4, 010 min (about 2.8 days) down to µ = 125 min (about
2 hours). Whatever the underlying failure distribution, it is scaled so that its expectation
corresponds to the platform MTBF µ. The application size is set to Timebase = 10, 000
years/N.
Log-based failure traces – To corroborate the results obtained with synthetic failure
traces, and to further assess the performance of our algorithms, we also perform simulations
using the failure logs of two production clusters. We use logs of the largest clusters among
the preprocessed logs in the Failure trace archive [22], i.e., for clusters at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory [19]. In these logs, each failure is tagged by the node —and not the
processor— on which the failure occurred. Among the 26 possible clusters, we opted for the
logs of the only two clusters with more than 1,000 nodes. The motivation is that we need a
sample history sufficiently large to simulate platforms with more than ten thousand nodes.
The two chosen logs are for clusters 18 (LANL18) and 19 (LANL19) in the archive (referred
to as 7 and 8 in [19]). For each log, we record the set S of availability intervals. The discrete
failure distribution for the simulation is generated as follows: the conditional probability
P(X ≥ t | X ≥ τ) that a node stays up for a duration t, knowing that it has been up for
a duration τ , is set to the ratio of the number of availability durations in S greater than or
equal to t, over the number of availability durations in S greater than or equal to τ .
The two clusters used for computing our log-based failure distributions consist of 4-
processor nodes. Hence, to simulate a platform of, say, 216 processors, we generate 214
failure traces, one for each 4-processor node. In the logs the individual (processor) MTBF is
µind = 691 days for the LANL18 cluster, and µind = 679 days for the LANL19 cluster. The
LANL18 and LANL19 traces are logs for systems which comprised 4,096 processors. Using
these logs to generate traces for a system made of 524, 288 processors, as the largest platforms
we consider with synthetic failure traces, would lead to an obvious risk of oversampling.
Therefore, we limit the size of the log-based traces we generate: we let the total number of
processors N varies from N = 1, 024 to N = 131, 072, so that the platform MTBF µ varies
from µ = 971 min (about 16 hours) down to µ = 7.5 min. The application size is set to
Timebase = 250 years/N.
Predicted failures and false predictions – Once we have generated a failure trace, we
need to determine which faults are predicted and which are not. In order to do so, we consider
all faults in a trace one by one. For each of them, we randomly decide, with probability r,
whether it is predicted.
We use the simulation engine to generate a random trace of false predictions. The main
problem is to decide the shape of the distribution that false predictions should follow. To the
best of our knowledge, no published study ever addressed that problem. For synthetic failure
traces, we report results when false predictions follow the same distribution than faults (ex-
cept, of course, that both distributions do not have the same mean value). In AppendixB,
we report on simulations when false predictions are generated according to a uniform dis-
tribution; the results are quite similar. For log-based failures, we only report results when
false predictions are generated according to a uniform distribution (because we believe that
scaling down a discrete, actual distribution may not be meaningful).
17
The distribution of false predictions is always scaled so that its expectation is equal
to µP
1−p
= pµ
r(1−p)
, the inter-arrival time of false predictions. Finally, the failure trace and
the false-prediction trace are merged to produce the final trace including all events (true
predictions, false predictions, and non predicted faults). Each reported value is the average
over 100 randomly generated instances.
Checkpointing, recovery, and downtime costs – The experiments use parameters that
are representative of current and forthcoming large-scale platforms [23, 24]. We take C =
R = 10 min, and D = 1 min for the synthetic failure traces. For the log-based traces we
consider smaller platforms. Therefore, we take C = R = 1 min, and D = 6s. Whatever the
trace, we consider three scenarios for the proactive checkpoints: either proactive checkpoints
are (i) exactly as expensive as periodic ones (Cp = C), (ii) ten times cheaper (Cp = 0.1C),
and (iii) two times more expensive (Cp = 2C).
Heuristics – In the simulations, we compare four checkpointing strategies:
• RFO is the checkpointing strategy of period T =
√
2(µ− (D +R))C (see Section 3).
• OptimalPrediction is the refined algorithm described in Section 4.2.
• To assess the quality of each strategy, we compare it with its BestPeriod counterpart,
defined as the same strategy but using the best possible period T . This latter period
is computed via a brute-force numerical search for the optimal period (each tested
period is evaluated on 100 randomly generated traces, and the period achieving the
best average performance is elected as the “best period”).
Fault predictors – We experiment using the characteristics of two predictors from the
literature: one accurate predictor with high recall and precision [7], namely with p = 0.82
and r = 0.85, and another predictor with intermediate recall and precision [8], namely with
p = 0.4 and r = 0.7.
In practice, a predictor will not be able to predict the exact time at which a predicted
fault will strike the system. Therefore, in the simulations, when a predictor predicts that
a failure will strike the system at a date t (true prediction), the failure actually occurs
exactly at time t for heuristic OptimalPrediction, and between time t and time t + 2C
for heuristic InexactPrediction (the probability of fault is uniformly distributed in the
time-interval). OptimalPrediction can thus be seen as a best case. The comparison
between OptimalPrediction and InexactPrediction enables us to assess the impact
of the time imprecision of predictions, and to show that the obtained results are quite robust
to this type of imprecision. The choice of an interval length of 2C is quite arbitrary. For
synthetic traces, this corresponds to 1,200 s, which is quite a significant imprecision.
5.2. Simulations with synthetic traces
Figures 3 and 4 show the average waste degradation for the two checkpointing policies,
and for their BestPeriod counterparts, for both predictors. The waste is reported as a
function of the number of processors N . We draw the plots as a function of the number
of processors N rather than of the platform MTBF µ = µind/N , because it is more natural
to see the waste increase with larger platforms. However, recall that this work is agnostic
of the granularity of the processing elements and intrinsically focuses on the impact of the
MTBF on the waste.
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We also report job execution times, in Table 3 when fault distribution follows an Expo-
nential distribution law, and in Tables 4 and 5 for a Weibull distribution law with shape
parameter k = 0.7 and k = 0.5 respectively.
Validation of the theoretical study – We used Maple to analytically compute and plot
the optimal value of the waste for both the algorithm taking predictions into account, Opti-
malPrediction, and for the algorithm ignoring them, RFO. In order to check the accuracy
of our model, we have compared these results with results obtained with the discrete-event
simulator.
We first observe that there is a very good correspondence between analytical results
and simulations in Figures 3 and 4. In particular, the Maple plots and the simulations for
Exponentially distributed faults are very similar. This shows the validity of the model and
of its analysis. Another striking result is that OptimalPrediction has the same waste
as its BestPeriod counterpart, even for Weibull fault distributions, in all but the most
extreme cases. In the other cases, the waste achieved by OptimalPrediction is very
close to that of its BestPeriod counterpart. This demonstrates the very good quality of
our checkpointing period TPred. These conclusions are valid regardless of the cost ratio of
periodic and proactive checkpoints.
In Tables 3 through 5 we report the execution times obtained when using the expression
of T given by Young [9] and Daly [10] (denoted respectively as Young and Daly) to assess
whether TRFO is a better approximation. (Recall that these three approaches ignore the
predictions, which explains why the numbers are identical on both sides of each table.)
The expressions of T given by Young, Daly, and RFO are identical for Exponential
distributions and the three heuristics achieve the same performance (Table 3). This confirms
the analytical evaluation of Table 2 in Section 3. For Weibull distributions (Tables 4 and 5),
RFO achieves lower makespan, and the difference becomes even more significant as the size
of the platform increases. Moreover, it is striking to observe in Table 5 that job execution
time increases together with the number for processors (from N = 216 to N = 219) if the
checkpointing period is Daly or Young. On the contrary, job execution time (rightfully)
decreases when using RFO, even if the decrease is moderate with respect to the increase
of the platform size. Altogether, the main (striking) conclusion is that RFO should be
preferred to both classical approaches for Weibull distributions.
The benefits of prediction – The second observation is that the prediction is useful
for the vast majority of the set of parameters under study! In addition, when proactive
checkpoints are cheaper than periodic ones, the benefits of fault prediction are increased.
On the contrary, when proactive checkpoints are more expensive than periodic ones, the
benefits of fault prediction are greatly reduced. One can even observe that the waste with
prediction is not better than without prediction in the following scenario: Cp = 2C, and using
the limited-quality predictor (p = 0.4, r = 0.7) with 219 processors, see Figures 4(i),(j),(k),
and (l).
In Tables 3 through 5 we compute the gain (expressed in percentage) achieved by Opti-
malPrediction over RFO. As a general trend, we observe that the gains due to predictions
are more important when the distribution law is further apart from an Exponential distri-
19
BestPeriod RFO
OptimalPrediction
BestPeriod OptimalPrediction
RFO
(a) Maple
218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(b) Exponential
218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(c) Weibull k = 0.7
218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
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(l) Weibull k = 0.5
Figure 3: Waste (y-axis) for the different heuristics as a function of the platform size (x-axis), with p = 0.82,
r = 0.85, Cp = C (first row), Cp = 0.1C (second row), or Cp = 2C (third row) and with a trace of false
predictions parametrized by a distribution identical to the distribution of the failure trace.
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(e) Maple
218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(f) Exponential
218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(g) Weibull k = 0.7
218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(h) Weibull k = 0.5
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(l) Weibull k = 0.5
Figure 4: Waste (y-axis) for the different heuristics as a function of the platform size (x-axis), with p = 0.4,
r = 0.7, Cp = C (first row), Cp = 0.1C (second row), or Cp = 2C (third row) and with a trace of false
predictions parametrized by a distribution identical to the distribution of the failure trace.
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bution. Indeed, the largest gains are when the fault distribution follows a Weibull law of
parameter 0.5. Using OptimalPrediction in conjunction with a “good” fault predictor
we report gains up to 66% when there is a large number of processors (219). The gain is
still of 37% with 216 processors. Using a predictor with limited recall and precision, Opti-
malPrediction can still decrease the execution time by 47% with 219 processors, and 31%
with 216 processors. In all tested cases, the decrease of the execution times is significant.
Gains are less important with Weibull laws of shape parameter k = 0.7, however they are
still reaching a minimum of 13% with 216 processors, and up to 38% with 219 processors.
Finally, gains are further reduced with an Exponential law. They are still reaching at least
5% with 216 processors, and up to 19% with 219 processors.
The performance of InexactPrediction shows that using a fault predictor remains
largely beneficial even in the presence of large uncertainties on the time the predicted faults
will actually occur (see Tables 3, 4, and 5). When N = 216 the degradation with respect to
OptimalPrediction is of 3% for a Weibull law with shape parameter k = 0.7, and the
minimum gain over RFO is still of 10%. When the shape parameter of the Weibull law is
k = 0.5, the degradation is of 7% when, for a minimum gain of 26% over RFO.
Execution time (in days) Execution time (in days)
Cp = C (p = 0.82, r = 0.85) (p = 0.4, r = 0.7)
216 procs 219 procs 216 procs 219 procs
Young 65.2 11.7 65.2 11.7
Daly 65.2 11.8 65.2 11.8
RFO 65.2 11.7 65.2 11.7
OptimalPrediction 60.0 (8%) 9.5 (19%) 61.7 (5%) 10.7 (8%)
InexactPrediction 60.6 (7%) 10.2 (13%) 62.3 (4%) 11.4 (3%)
Table 3: Job execution times for an Exponential distribution, and gains due to the fault predictor (with
respect to the performance of RFO).
Execution time (in days) Execution time (in days)
Cp = C (p = 0.82, r = 0.85) (p = 0.4, r = 0.7)
216 procs 219 procs 216 procs 219 procs
Young 81.3 30.1 81.3 30.1
Daly 81.4 31.0 81.4 31.0
RFO 80.3 25.5 80.3 25.5
OptimalPrediction 65.9 (18%) 15.9 (38%) 69.7 (13%) 20.2 (21%)
InexactPrediction 68.0 (15%) 20.3 (20%) 72.0 (10%) 24.6 (4%)
Table 4: Job execution times for a Weibull distribution with shape parameter k = 0.7, and gains due to the
fault predictor (with respect to the performance of RFO).
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Execution time (in days) Execution time (in days)
Cp = C (p = 0.82, r = 0.85) (p = 0.4, r = 0.7)
216 procs 219 procs 216 procs 219 procs
Young 125.5 171.8 125.5 171.8
Daly 125.8 184.7 125.8 184.7
RFO 120.2 114.8 120.2 114.8
OptimalPrediction 75.9 (37%) 39.5 (66%) 83.0 (31%) 60.8 (47%)
InexactPrediction 82.0 (32%) 60.8 (47%) 89.4 (26%) 76.6 (33%)
Table 5: Job execution times for a Weibull distribution with shape parameter k = 0.5, and gains due to the
fault predictor (with respect to the performance of RFO).
5.3. Simulations with log-based traces
Figure 5 shows the average waste degradation for the two checkpointing policies, and for
their BestPeriod counterparts, for both predictors, both traces, and the three scenarios
for proactive checkpoints. Tables 6 and 7 present job execution times for RFO, Optimal-
Prediction, and InexactPrediction, for both traces and for platform sizes smaller than
as the ones reported in Tables 3 through 5 for synthetic traces. The waste for RFO is closer
to its BestPeriod counterpart with log-based traces than with Weibull-based traces. As a
consequence, when prediction with OptimalPrediction is beneficial, it is beneficial with
respect to both RFO, and to RFO’s BestPeriod.
Overall, we observe similar results and reach the same conclusions with log-based traces
as with synthetic ones. The waste of OptimalPrediction is very close to that of its
BestPeriod counterpart for platforms containing up to 216 processors. This demonstrates
the validity of our analysis for the actual traces considered. The waste of OptimalPre-
diction is often significantly larger than that of its BestPeriod counterpart for platforms
containing 217 processors. The problem with the largest considered platforms may be due to
oversampling. Indeed, the original logs recorded events for platforms comprising only 4,096
processors and respectively contained only 3,010 and 2,343 availability intervals.
As with synthetic failure traces, prediction turns out to be useful for the vast majority
of tested configurations. The only cases when prediction is not useful is with the “bad”
predictor (r = 0.7 and p = 0.4), when the cost of proactive checkpoint is larger than the cost
of periodic checkpoints (Cp = 2C), and when considering the largest of platforms (N = 2
17).
This extreme case is, however, the only one for which prediction is not beneficial. It is not
surprising that predictions are not useful when there are a lot of false predictions that require
the use of expensive proactive actions. Looking at Tables 6 and 7, one could remark that
performance gains due to the predictions are similar to the ones observed with Exponential-
based traces, and are significantly smaller than the ones observed with Weibull-based traces.
However, recall that we remarked that gains increase with the size of the platform, and that
we consider smaller platforms when using log-based traces.
Finally, the imprecision related to the time where predicted faults strike, induces a per-
formance degradation. However, this degradation is rather limited for the most efficient of
the two predictors considered, or when the platform size is not too large.
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LANL19 cluster with p = 0.4, r = 0.7.
Figure 5: Waste (y-axis) for the different heuristics as a function of the platform size (x-axis) with failures
based on the failure log of LANL clusters 18 and 19.
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Execution time (in days) Execution time (in days)
Cp = C (p = 0.82, r = 0.85) (p = 0.4, r = 0.7)
214 procs 217 procs 214 procs 217 procs
RFO 26.8 4.88 26.8 4.88
OptimalPrediction 24.4 (9%) 3.89 (20%) 25.2 (6%) 4.44 (9%)
InexactPrediction 24.7 (8%) 4.20 (14%) 25.5 (5%) 4.73 (3%)
Table 6: Job execution times with failures based on the failure log of LANL18 cluster, and gains due to the
fault predictor (with respect to the performance of RFO).
Execution time (in days) Execution time (in days)
Cp = C (p = 0.82, r = 0.85) (p = 0.4, r = 0.7)
214 procs 217 procs 214 procs 217 procs
RFO 26.8 4.86 26.8 4.86
OptimalPrediction 24.4 (9%) 3.85 (21%) 25.2 (6%) 4.42 (9%)
InexactPrediction 24.6 (8%) 4.14 (15%) 25.4 (5%) 4.71 (3%)
Table 7: Job execution times with failures based on the failure log of LANL19 cluster, and gains due to the
fault predictor (with respect to the performance of RFO).
5.4. Recall vs. precision
In this section, we assess the impact of the two key parameters of the predictor, its
recall r and its precision p. To this purpose, we conduct simulations with synthetic traces,
where one parameter is fixed while the other varies. We choose two platforms, a smaller
one with N = 216 processors (or a MTBF µ = 1, 000 min) and a larger one with N = 219
processors (or a MTBF µ = 125 min). In both cases we study the impact of the predictor
characteristics assuming a Weibull fault distribution with shape parameter either 0.5 or 0.7,
under the scenario Cp = C.
In Figures 6 and 7, we fix the value of r (either r = 0.4 or r = 0.8) and we let p vary
from 0.3 to 0.99. In the four plots, we observe that the precision has a minor impact on
the waste, whether it is with a Weibull distribution of shape parameter 0.7 (Figure 6), or a
Weibull distribution of shape parameter 0.5 (Figure 7). In Figures 8 and 9, we conduct the
converse experiment and fix the value of p (either p = 0.4 or p = 0.8), letting r vary from
0.3 to 0.99. Here we observe that increasing the recall significantly improves performance,
in all but one configuration. In the configuration where improving the recall does not make
a (significant) difference, there is a very large number of faults and a low precision, hence
a large number of false predictions which negatively impact the performance whatever the
value of the recall.
Altogether we conclude that it is more important (for the design of future predictors) to
focus on improving the recall r rather than the precision p, and our results can help quantify
this statement. We provide an intuitive explanation as follows: unpredicted faults prove very
harmful and heavily increase the waste, while unduly checkpointing due to false predictions
(usually) turns out to induce a smaller overhead.
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Figure 6: Waste (y-axis) as a function of the precision (x-axis) for a fixed recall (r = 0.4 and r = 0.8) and
for a Weibull distribution of faults (with shape parameter k = 0.7).
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Figure 7: Waste (y-axis) as a function of the precision (x-axis) for a fixed recall (r = 0.4 and r = 0.8) and
for a Weibull distribution of faults (with shape parameter k = 0.5).
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Figure 8: Waste (y-axis) as a function of the recall (x-axis) for a fixed precision (p = 0.4 and p = 0.8) and
for a Weibull distribution (k=0.7).
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Figure 9: Waste (y-axis) as a function of the recall (x-axis) for a fixed precision (p = 0.4 and p = 0.8) and
for a Weibull distribution (k=0.5).
6. Related work
Considerable research has been devoted to fault prediction, using very different models
(system log analysis [7], event-driven approach [4, 7, 8], support vector machines [6, 3],
nearest neighbors [6], etc). In this section we give a brief overview of existing predictors,
focusing on their characteristics rather than on the methods of prediction. For the sake of
clarity, we sum up the characteristics of the different fault predictors from the literature in
Table 8.
The authors of [8] introduce the lead time, that is the duration between the time the
prediction is made and the time the predicted fault is supposed to happen. This time should
be sufficiently large to enable proactive actions. As already mentioned, the distribution of
lead times is irrelevant. Indeed, only predictions whose lead time is greater than Cp, the time
to take a proactive checkpoint, are meaningful. Predictions whose lead time is smaller than
Cp, whenever they materialize as actual faults, should be classified as unpredicted faults; the
predictor recall should be decreased accordingly.
The predictor of [8] is also able to locate where the predicted fault is supposed to strike.
This additional characteristics has a negative impact on the precision (because a fault hap-
pening at the predicted time but not on the predicted location is classified as a non predicted
fault; see the low value of p in Table 8). The authors of [8] state that fault localization has a
positive impact on proactive checkpointing time in their context: instead of a full checkpoint
costing 1, 500 seconds they can take a partial checkpoint costing only 12 seconds. This led
us to introduce a different cost Cp for proactive checkpoints, that can be smaller than the
cost C of regular checkpoints. Gainaru et al. [5] also stated that fault-localization could help
decrease the checkpointing time. Their predictor also gives information on fault localization.
They studied the impact of different lead times on the recall of their predictor. Papers [7]
and [6] also considered lead times.
Most studies on fault prediction state that a proactive action must be taken right before
the predicted fault, be it a checkpoint or a migration. However, we have shown in this paper
that it is beneficial to ignore some predictions, namely when the predicted fault is announced
to strike less than Cp
p
seconds after the last periodic checkpoint.
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Paper Lead Time Precision Recall
[8] 300 s 40 % 70 %
[8] 600 s 35 % 60 %
[7] 2h 64.8 % 65.2 %
[7] 0 min 82.3 % 85.4 %
[4] 32 s 93 % 43 %
[5] 10s 92 % 40 %
[5] 60s 92 % 20 %
[5] 600s 92 % 3 %
[3] NA 70 % 75 %
[6] NA 20 % 30 %
[6] NA 30 % 75 %
[6] NA 40 % 90 %
[6] NA 50 % 30 %
[6] NA 60 % 85 %
Table 8: Comparative study of different parameters returned by some predictors.
Gainaru et al. [5] studied the impact of prediction on the checkpointing period. Their
computation of the total waste is not fully accurate and they do not provide any minimiza-
tion analysis. Instead, they only propose to use Young’s formula, replacing the MTBF by
the mean-time of unpredicted faults. They do not question whether all predictions should
be taken into account. Furthermore, they did not conduct any simulations; instead they
analytically computed the ratio of the waste with and without predictions and instantiated
the corresponding formula with several scenarios.
Li et al. [25] considered the mathematical problem of when and how to migrate. In order
to be able to use migration, they assumed that at any time 2% of the resources are available as
spares. This allows them to conceive a Knapsack-based heuristic. Thanks to their algorithm,
they were able to save 30% of the execution time compared to a heuristic that does not take
the prediction into account, with a precision and recall of 70%, and with a maximum load
of 0.7. In our study we do not consider that we have a batch of spare resources. We assume
that after a downtime the resources that failed are once again available.
Note that some authors [7, 6] do not consider that their predictors predict the exact
time of the fault. On the contrary, they consider a “prediction window” which is the time
interval in which the predicted is supposed to occur. Because most papers focus on prediction
windows of negligible length, we did not consider prediction windows in this study.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to focus on the mathematical
aspect of fault prediction, and to provide a model and a detailed analysis of the waste due
to all three types of events (true and false predictions and unpredicted failures).
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7. Conclusion
In this work we have studied the impact of fault prediction on periodic checkpointing.
We started by revisiting the first-order approach by Young and Daly. We have performed
a refined analysis leading to a better checkpointing period: TRFO is slightly closer to the
optimal period for Exponential distributions (the only case where the optimal is known),
and leads to smaller execution times for Weibull distributions (as shown in Section 5.2).
Then we have extended the analysis to include fault predictions. We have established
analytical conditions stating whether a fault prediction should be taken into account or not.
More importantly, we have proven that the optimal approach is to never trust the predictor
in the beginning of a regular period, and to always trust it in the end of the period; the
cross-over point Cp
p
depends on the time to take a proactive checkpoint and on the precision
of the predictor. This striking result is somewhat unexpected, as one might have envisioned
more trust regimes, with several intermediate trust levels smoothly evolving from a “never
trust” policy to an “always trust” one.
We have conducted simulations involving synthetic failure traces following either an Ex-
ponential distribution law or a Weibull one. We have also used log-based failure traces.
In addition, we have used exact prediction dates and uncertainty intervals for these dates.
Through this extensive experiment setting, we have established the accuracy of the model,
of its analysis, and of the predicted period (in the presence of a fault predictor). The sim-
ulations also show that even a not-so-good fault predictor can lead to quite a significant
decrease in the application execution time. We have also shown that the most important
characteristic of a fault predictor is its recall (the percentage of actually predicted faults)
rather than its precision (the percentage of predictions that actually correspond to faults):
better safe than sorry, or better prepare for a false event than miss an actual failure!
Altogether, the analytical model and the comprehensive results provided in this work
enable to fully assess the impact of fault prediction on optimal checkpointing strategies.
Future work will be devoted to the study of the impact of fault prediction on uncoordinated
or hierarchical checkpointing protocols. Another challenging problem is to determine the best
trade-off between performance and energy consumption when combining several resilience
techniques such as checkpointing, prediction, and replication.
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AppendixA.
For the sake of completeness, we provide a proof of the following result:
Proposition 2. Consider a platform comprising N components, and assume that the inter-
arrival times of the faults on the components are independent and identically distributed
random variables that follow an arbitrary probability law whose expectation is µind. Then the
expectation of the inter-arrival times of the faults on the whole platform is µ = µind
N
.
Proof. Consider first a single component, say component number q. Let Xi, i ≥ 0 denote
the IID random variables for fault inter-arrival times on that component, with E (Xi) = µind.
Consider a fixed time bound F . Let nq(F ) be the number of faults on the component until
time F is exceeded. In other words, the (nq(F )−1)-th fault is the last one to happen strictly
before time F , and the nq(F )-th fault is the first to happen at time F or after. By definition
of nq(F ), we have
nq(F )−1∑
i=1
Xi ≤ F ≤
nq(F )∑
i=1
Xi
Using Wald’s equation [26, p. 486], with nq(F ) as a stopping criterion, we derive:
(E (nq(F ))− 1)µind ≤ F ≤ E (nq(F ))µind
and we obtain:
lim
F→+∞
E (nq(F ))
F
=
1
µind
(A.1)
Consider now the whole platform, and let Yi, i ≥ 0 denote the IID random variables for
fault inter-arrival times on the platform, with E (Yi) = µ. Consider a fixed time bound F as
before. Let n(F ) be the number of faults on the whole platform until time F is exceeded.
With the same reasoning for the whole platform as for a single component, we derive:
lim
F→+∞
E (n(F ))
F
=
1
µ
(A.2)
Now let mq(F ) be the number of these faults that strike component number q. Of course
we have n(F ) =
∑N
q=1mq(F ). By definition, except for the component hit by the last
failure, mq(F ) + 1 is the number of failures on component q until time F is exceeded, hence
nq(F ) = mq(F ) + 1 (and this number is mq(F ) = nq(F ) on the component hit by the last
failure). From Equation (A.1) again, we have for each component q:
lim
F→+∞
E (mq(F ))
F
=
1
µind
Since n(F ) =
∑N
q=1mq(F ), we also have:
lim
F→+∞
E (n(F ))
F
=
N
µind
(A.3)
Equations (A.2) and (A.3) lead to the result.
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Figure B.10: Waste (y-axis) for the different heuristics as a function of the platform size (x-axis), with
p = 0.82, r = 0.85, Cp = C (first row), Cp = 0.1C (second row), or Cp = 2C (third row) and with a trace of
false predictions parametrized by a uniform distribution.
AppendixB.
In this section, we provide results for synthetic failure traces when false predictions are
generated according to a uniform distribution.
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Figure B.11: Waste (y-axis) for the different heuristics as a function of the platform size (x-axis), with
p = 0.4, r = 0.7, Cp = C (first row), Cp = 0.1C (second row), or Cp = 2C (third row) and with a trace of
false predictions parametrized by a uniform distribution..
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